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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
PRECATORY TRUSTS. The law as to the construction of precatory
words is not reducible to a formula which can be made to fit any
particular case. In fact, it is hard more than to indicate an inclin-
ation or leaning of the courts in deciding such situations.
With this preface in mind, we purpose to examine the early line
of authorities, the modern trend at large, and the particular cases
in Washington.
Early English courts raised trusts on mere precatory words.1
The reason for this rule was perhaps because originally all trusts
were at best only of precatory force, and so would most naturally
be couched in words of entreaty and desire, then when trusts be-
came enforced by law, since trusts had been more often created by
precatory words, the courts treated all precatory words as imper-
ative, deeming such to be the intent of the testator.2 The English
courts, quite reasonably in view of the history of trusts, presumed
that the words were but courteous commands.8
As early as 1827, however, there were murmurings against the
rule of those early decisions. 4 The vice-chancellor then said, "The
current of decisions has, of late years, been against converting the
legatee into a trustee." Again in 1854,' the court remarked against
the rule, but yet six years later they reiterated the old holding.'
But in 1871 the English court definitely broke away from the old
authorities.' Subsequent decisions, following the new lead, so dis-
tinguished and hedged in the early cases as to make them no longer
the law of England."
A few American jurisdictions 9 perhaps continue to follow the
former English doctrine, but the modern cast of American author-
ity is in accord with the now prevailing English view, which is,
2 Eales v. England, Prec. Ch. 200, 24 Eng. Rep. 96 (1702) "Not doubt-
ing but she will give" as creating a trust: Massey v. Sherman, 1 Ambl. 520,
27 Eng. Rep. 335 (1739) "Desire" Harding v. Glyn, 1 Atk, 469, 26 Eng. Rep.
299 (1739).
'In Re Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. 268, 59 Am. Dec. 718 (1853).
'Malim v. Keighley, 2 Ves. 333, 30 Eng. Rep. 659 (1794) Wright v.
Atkyns, 17 Ves. 255, 1 T. R. 143 (1810).
A devise to a wife "recommending to her and not doubting" that she
would consider his near relatives was held not to create a trust: Sale v.
Moore, 1 Sim. 534, 57 Eng. Rep. 678 (1827).
Palmer v. Simmonds, 2 Drew 221, 61 Eng. Rep. 704 (1854)
Testator's desire that if his children conducted themselves to his wife's
approbation they be left property was held to create a trust: Bonsor v.
Kinnear 2 Giff. 195, 66 Eng, Rep. 82 (1860).
'Sir G. Mellish said, " I do not understand how a court of equity
can execute a trust where the testator says that he has such confidence In
his widow that he wishes her and not this Court of Chancery to say what
share she shall have and what share the children shall have"- Lambe
v. Eames, L. R. 6 Ch. 597, 25 Eng. Rul. Cas. 471 (1871).
In Re Williams Estate, 2 Ch. 12, 66 L. J. (Ch.) 296 (1897) In Re
Hutchinson and Tenant, 8 Ch. D. 540. 39 L. T. (ns) 86 (1878).
949 A. L. R. 19 cites as such jurisdictions Maryland, New Jersey and
Washington. Nunn v. O'Brien, 83 Md. 198, 34 A. 244 (1896) cf. Pratt v.
Sheppard & E. P Hosp., 88 Md. 10, 42 A. 51 (1898) Words of wish, desire
and request operate to create a trust: Deacon v. Cobson, 83 N. J. Eq. 122, 89
A. 1029 (1914) but see Van Duyne v. Van Duyne, 14 N. J. Eq. 39 (1862)
where the court said, "A command Is certainly sufficiently Imperative. So
a hope or wish may be if addressed to an executor or trustee. But
standing alone, and to a legatee ., they are not Imperative."
NOTES AND COMMENTS
concisely, that to raise a trust from precatory words, the court
must be satisfied that the intent to create a trust is as clear as
though it had been created by the use of ordinary trust lan-
guage. As was held in Russell v. U S. Trust Co.,'0 the language
to create a trust must be a command and not merely the testator's
expression of hope or confidence, or as expressed in In Re Marti's
Estate,1 it must appear that the testator intended to impose an
imperative obligation and used words which excluded the exercise
of discretion or option in reference to the act in question. Prima
facie a mere request or expression of hope or confidence does not
import a command. 12
However, the doctrine of the majority courts will perhaps per-
mit the raising of a trust where the precatory words, in conjunction
with relevant circumstances' s and with. the context of the will"
show that the words were intended to be imperative. A distinction
has also been made between preactory words addressed to an inter-
ested devisee and where addressed to a mere executor or disinter-
ested trustee. In these situations, the courts are more willing
to find that such expressions are mandatory, for such disinterested
persons ought to be bound by the mere wish of a testator.'
Perhaps the Washington court has taken a somewhat more liberal
view of the problem in favor of the beneficiaries than most jurisdic-
tions, going far to uphold trusts created by precatory words. For
instance, in Hunt v. Hunt' the court said that a trust might be
created by precatory words, if the words were not so modified by
the context as to amount to a mere suggestion. A comparison of
this dictum with the holding of the early English cases reveals that
in each a presumption in favor of the trust is indulged in. In
Lanigan v. MiTes,' 7 although the court refused to create a trust
where the testator had left property to one Miles "with full con-
fidence that Miles would make proper adjustment," it indicated
that such words alone "might" support an offer of oral proof
to make the several shares certain." But these precatory words
were further qualified, as suggested in Hunt v. Hunt, supra, by
20136 Fed. 758, 69 C. C. A. 410 (1905).
11132 Cal. 666, 61 Pac. 964 (1900).
2 See also Howells State Bk. v. Polit, 113 Neb. 181, 202 N. W. 457 (1925)
and In Re Barney. 207 App. Div. 25, 201 N. Y. S. 647 (1923).
2In In Re Thzstlethwaite et al., 104 N. Y. S. 264 138 N. Y., 264 (1907)
the court looked into circumstances surrounding the making of a will to
determine what was the intent of the testator In connection with words
of "desire" used in a gift.
2"- precatory words should not only be of such character as to
indicate that the testator indicated a trust to be created, but they must be
consistent with other provisions of the will " Mitchell v. Mitchell ,143
Ind. 113, 42 N. E. 465 (1895).
5"A peculiar confidence Is always presumed to exist between an
executor and testator. The slightest wishes of the latter ought to
be binding on the conscience of the former" .Erckson v. Willard, 1 N. EL
217 (1818) see also Van Duyne v. Van Duyne, supra; Central Trust Co.
v. Egleston, 47 Misc. 693, 98 N. Y. S. 1055 (1905).
"The expression "I desire $15,000.00 to be given to my foster son
at any time convenient to my executrix" was held not to create a trust,
for to have so held would have depleted the estate: 18 Vash. 14, 50 Pac.
578 (1897).
"1102 Wash. 82. 172 Pac. 894 (1918) cf In Be Mac Martin's Estate, 131
Wash. 192, 229 Pac. 530 (1924).
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language showing that the expression was not imperative. The
fact, however, that the court quotes with approval the test of a
precatorv trust as set out in the early English case of Wright v.
Atkyns, supra., is indicative of the inclination of that body
In Re Hochbrunn's case 8 illustrates the result hinted at in Hunt
v. Hunt, supra. There a devise was coupled with a "special re-
quest" to make a certain disposition. Nothing in circumstance or
expression qualified the request and a trust was held to have been
created."'
The latest pronouncement of the Washington court on this prob-
lem is in Woodcock v. McCord20  The facts are here set out in
some detail to aid in a thorough analysis of the decision.
By will testator Williams gave to the defendants the remainder
of his property "for the following purposes and uses and upon
the following trusts.
"I suggest said trustees sell and dispose of my stock of
merchandise, mill and mill plant to a corporation to be organized
by my employees." There followed quite specific plans as to the
proposed organization, together with plans of the manner of pur-
chase by the employees. The closing paragraph of this section of
the will was phrased in this manner- "All provisions of this sub-
division of my will in regard to the formation of such corporation
and purchase of said business and in fact all provisions of this
subdivision are not mandatory upon my trustees, but are merely
a suggestion as a basis of working out a plan whereby the business
can be handled advantageously."
Williams' wife and an adopted son were residuary legatees as
well as recipients of specific bequests. Defendants were the execu-
tors and trustees under the will, whom the plaintiffs, three employee
incorporators of the 0. B. Williams Co., sue to require to convey the
sawmill plant to the corporation.
The lower court held on a demurrer that the trustees had the dis-
cretion to sell or not as they wished. The Supreme Court held
that the complaint was good as against a general demurrer and
required the trustees to submit a plan for carrying out the testator's
intent as interpreted by them. Four justices dissented.
It seems quite clear that the case must turn on the questiou
of whether or not an enforcible trust was created in favor of the
plaintiffs. And it is recognized law that to determine whether
or not a trust has been created by a will the court must look first
to the instrument creating it.2 However, when "necessary and
appropriate," circumstances under which the will was made may
be considered.22
Looking then only to the language of the will in the Woodcock
case, we find that the testator suggests a plan whereby the trustees
11 138 Wash. 415, 244 Pac 698, 49 A. L. R_ 7 (1926).
'DCourt will consider fact that testator knew trust language: In Re
King's Estate. 144 Wash. 281, 257 Pac. 848 (1927).
160 Wash. 607, 295 Pac. 734 (1931).
n Newport v. Newport, 5 Wash. 114, 31 Pac. 428 (1892) "It has long
been settled that in construing wills, the intention of the testator is to be
collected from the words of the will itself read in the light of surround-
ing circumstances." 28 R. C. L. 214 Sec. 174, note 22. In Re Marti's Estate,
supra.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
might organize a corporation of employees and sell certain property
to such corporation. Under the dictum thrown out in the Hunt
case, supra, possibly the plaintiffs could stand on these words of
suggestion, nothing more appearing. Their position is further
strengthened when we look at the position of the defendants. The
trustees were not interested devisees, but were only executors of
the will invested with title for a particular purpose. Relying on the
rule set out in Erickson v. Willard, supra, the plaintiffs could main-
tain that the mere wish of the testator should bind the executors.
But neither of these grounds seem sufficient to uphold the trust
when viewed in the light of the concluding sentence of this section
of the will set out above. This sentence seems to negative any
possible imperative character that might be imparted to the original
words of suggestion, even though addressed to executors. Even in
line with the Hunt case, such a qualification of precatory words
ought to control.
The court hints, in the Woodcock decision, that what is decided
is that some plan of sale to the employees' corporation is mandatory
upon the trustees, and that the words granting discretion to them
refer only to the particular details of the sale. But it will be noted
that the only words sufficient to create a trust are those used in
connection with the particular plan suggested to the trustees. And
this plan is not mandatory, either by admission of the court, or
under the most liberal holding as possibly indicated in prior Wash-
ington decisions. This leaves, -then, only the introductory words
of the subdivision m which the property was given to the trustees
" for the following purposes and uses and upon the following
trusts, to wit." upon which to raise a trust. This language is not
sufficient to raise other than a constructive trust for the estate,
for it lacks certainty as to beneficiaries or objects of the intended
trust.,'
Thus since the particular plan is not mandatory, and since the
only possibility of creating a trust rested in precatory words used
as part of this optional plan, it must follow that no trust wa
created.
Perhaps the court was moved by what seemed a harsh case.'
Perhaps, too, out of the bewildering conflict of authorities as to the
effect of precatory words, 5 the court could find some authority to
support its holding in part, although they cited none. But in view
of the size of the gift to the employees compared with the gift to
the wife,28 and in view of the strict modern trend of the law set out
n Morzce v. Bishop of Durham, 10 Ves. Jr. 522, 32 Eng. Rep. 947 (1805)
Burnes v. Burnes, 70 C. C. A. 369, 137 Fed. 781 (1905) Lan-an v. Miles,
supra. For a discussion of the Morwe case see 5 Har. L. Rev. 389, 392; 65
Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 527, 538; 15 Har. L. Rev. 509; 37 Har L. Rev. 653, 687.
""The success of the business of 0. B. Williams was largely due to
the loyalty and cooperation of his employees." Woodcock v. M Cord, supra.
"Mitchell v. Mitchell, 143 Ind. 113, 42 N. E. 465, 49 A. L. R. 14 (1895).
Employees sought to purchase a business worth $361,041.22 for $75,
000.00, which purchase price is not enough to provide for all specific be-
quests of testator* Brief of Respondent Trustees, p. 28 in Woodcock case;
"In determining the intention of the settlor the following circumstances
are considered: (5) The financial situation of the parties; (7) Whether
the result reached would be such as settlor would naturally de-
sire"- Restatement of Law of Trusts, p. 82, See. 37b, 5, 7.
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above, or in light of the Washington cases it seems that the dissent-
ing opinion represents the correct view.
There is a faint suggestion in the majority opinion that the basis
of their decision is that the intent of the testator is ambiguous as
to the creation of a trust, and that the court decided only that the
complaint was good as against a general demurrei, without deciding
finally whether or not a trust was created. But a more careful
reading of the decision indicates that the only ambiguity troubling
the court was as to the extent of the gift and the conditions govern-
ing the sale. - - Further, considering the fact that the dissenting
opinion discusses only the problem of precatory trusts, it would
seem that this was the crucial question decided by the court.
The most recent opinion on the many questions raised in the
Williams Estate controversy bears out the above analysis in so
far as the result is concerned, for the Supreme Court on the last
appeal held that no trust was created, on the ground that the
beneficiaries were indefinite.2 8 The case will not be discussed at
length here, for it does not bear directly on the question of precatory
words, but it is submitted that the court could have finally settled
this troublesome cause when the question of precatory trusts was
raised on the demurrer by holding that no mandatory duty was
imposed upon the trustees.0
HOWARD R. STINSON.
21"It was there decided that their complaint stated a cause of action
to the legal effect that the provisions of the will created a precatory trust,
but designated certain provisions which were ambiguous " Holcomb,
J., dissenting in. In Re Williams Estate, 67 Wash. Dec. 423, 439 (1932).
21 On rehearing in the lower court, the point was raised as to the in-
definiteness of beneficiaries, on which point, tnter alia, the cause was again
heard before the Supreme Court. The appellants (residuary legatees)
pointed out that the proposed corporation was to be made up of employees
or of employees who had been employed five years, and that this phrase-
ology named two distinct classes of beneficiaries, resulting in indefinite-
ness.
The Court relied on the principle of Morice v. Bishop of Durham, supra,
upholding the contention of the appellants. Three justices dissented.
Woodcock v. McCord, 67 Wash. Dec. 423 (1932).
Granting that the result is correct, it is difficult to see how the Court
could decide that the employees stated a cause of action on a declaration
of trust, without then deciding that these beneficiaries (employees) were
too i-ndefinite. Although the first case arose on demurrer, finding that
there was an enforcible precatory trust (rightly or wrongly) it seems that
the Court should have searched the record before it for further defects.
Since the definiteness or indefiniteness of beneficaries appeared on the
face of the record then before the Court, it would seem that the court
inferentially then determined that there was no indefiniteness as to ben-
eficiaries.
